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Banking industries throughout the world have changed dramatically over the last
two decades. Technological progress and the globalization of ﬁnancial services have
exposed banks to increased competitive pressure and forced them to optimize their
operations and productivity, often through mergers and acquisitions (Amel et al.,
2004; Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003). The deregulation of the banking industry has
also played an important role in this regard (Megginson, 2005; Barth et al., 1999).
In this study, we examine the Italian and German banking systems which, until
the 1990s, shared similar characteristics, in particular with regard to the existence of
a large public banking sector. With the beginning of the 1990s both banking systems
started a profound process of consolidation which is still in progress. But while Italy
privatized its public banking sector, Germany has maintained a large share of state-
owned savings banks throughout. In Italy, mergers across diﬀerent banking sectors
became normal while in Germany mergers between savings banks and private banks
are prohibited by law. We aim to to shed new light on the eﬀects of consolidation and
privatization by comparing the evolution of these two important European banking
industries.
Two questions are at the center of our analysis: How did the productivity of Ger-
man and Italian banks develop during the 1990s, and how was it aﬀected by privati-
zation and consolidation? What are the most important components of productivity
growth: technical progress, eﬃciency gains, or the realization of scale economies?
As privatization is said to remove some constraints in the eﬃcient allocation of re-
sources one might expect a positive sign on total factor productivity (TFP) changes
for those banks aﬀected, at least in the longer run when the privatization and related
restructuring of the bank are completed. However, this hypothesis is only valid if
one believes that public banks are indeed less productive than private banks. We
also try to provide an answer to this question in our subsequent analysis. From a
theoretical viewpoint, the eﬀects of merger activities should have a positive eﬀect
on productivity, at least if they are motivated by scale economies. Since integration
costs can be high, the beneﬁts of mergers might be visible only in the longer term.
While there now exists an extensive body of literature on the eﬀects of M&A,
surprisingly little is known about the eﬀects of bank privatization in developed coun-
tries (Megginson, 2005), in particular when it comes to cross-dependencies between
merger and privatization eﬀects. Furthermore, while a number of studies analyze
individual productivity components for both banking markets, only few address all
three components simultaneously. 2 We aim to ﬁll this gap by analyzing how priva-
tization and consolidation have aﬀected banks’ TFP changes and its components:
1We thank participants to the conference on public and private ownership hosted by the Center
for Financial Studies (CFS), the Deutsche Bundesbank, and the Wharton Financial Institution
Center (WFIC) in Frankfurt in November 2006 for their useful suggestions. We also thank par-
ticipants of seminars at the Banca d’Italia in December 2007 and at the Deutsche Bundesbank in
February 2008. We are particularly grateful to Steven Ongena for his very helpful comments. The
paper represents the authors’ personal opinions and does not necessarily reﬂect the views of the
Banca d’Italia and the Deutsche Bundesbank. All errors are our own.
2For example, Lang and Welzel (1996), Altunbas et al. (2001), Maudos et al. (2002) or Casu
et al. (2004).
5(i) eﬃciency changes, (ii) scale economy changes and (iii) technical changes. To this
end, we use a unique dataset provided by the central banks of Italy and Germany
that includes information on M&A activities and ownership changes.
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. In section 2 we review the rel-
evant literature relating bank productivity to ownership changes and consolidation.
In section 3 we brieﬂy describe the Italian and German banking markets in terms
of structural and regulatory peculiarities. In section 4 we present the productivity
analysis of German and Italian banks. In particular, we discuss in section 4.1 how we
estimate TFP changes based on industry cost functions, we describe our database
in section 4.2, and we show the results of the productivity analysis in section 4.3.
In section 5, we explain how we use regression techniques to analyze the eﬀects of
privatization and consolidation on TFP change and its components, and we discuss
the results of the regression analysis in section 5.1. We conclude in section 6.
2 Bank Privatization, Consolidation, and Produc-
tivity
Ownership inﬂuences bank’s behavior signiﬁcantly. For instance, Berger et al. (2008)
report that Indian ﬁrms with relations to state-owned banks tend to maintain fewer
and less diversiﬁed ties to ﬁnancial institutions compared to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
banking with foreign intermediaries. Whether government or privately owned banks
also perform diﬀerently is another matter of long-standing debate. According to
Megginson (2005), government ownership of banks can be justiﬁed on the basis of
non-economic objectives, as a remedy to market failure, or a more eﬃcient way
to provide ﬁnance if contracts can either not be written completely or enforced.
But managers of government owned banks also face fewer incentives to maximize
revenue, are less well monitored, and most importantly are ineﬃcient by design since
they are constructed for the very purpose to serve politicians’ objectives rather than
pursuing value and welfare maximizing choices (Barth et al., 1999; La Porta et al.,
2002).
A number of studies ﬁnd accordingly that government owned banks are less eﬃ-
cient, see for example Bonin et al. (2005). But most studies concern less-developed or
developing countries and yield fairly mixed results across countries. Bhattacharyya
et al. (1997) analyze total factor productivity (TFP) growth of privatized Indian
banks between 1970 and 1992. Despite an initial fall in productivity, potentially
due to the new competitive market conditions, they ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvements
in TFP (up to 7% at the end of the observation period) thereafter. In contrast,
Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003), who analyze the relationship between deregulation
and TFP growth for Indian banks between 1985 and 1996, report the absence of
any TFP improvements. In fact, according to their results, public sector banks do
not respond well to deregulation. A number of country studies add to the ambi-
guity. Nakane and Weintraub (2005) (Brazil), Mohieldin and Nasr (2007) (Egypt),
and Gilbert and Wilson (1998) (Korea) report positive performance development of
privatized state-owned banks. On the other hand, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy
(2005) (Pakistan), Omran (2007) (Egypt) and Isik and Hassan (2003) (Turkey)
ﬁnd that eﬃciency gains are not sustained shortly after privatization or even that
6privately-owned banks experienced slower TFP growth compared to government-
owned institutions.
These contradicting ﬁndings may simply underpin that privatization is not a
panacea to remedy slack in the banking industry (Megginson, 2005). Partly, they
may also reﬂect three additional reasons that we seek to address in our study. First,
bank privatization in developed countries is likely to have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ef-
fects compared to developing countries usually studied (Barth et al., 1999; La Porta
et al., 2002). But direct evidence on the eﬀects of bank privatization in industrialized
countries remains scant. One exception is Micco et al. (2007), who conﬁrm a weak
correlation between ownership and bank performance in industrial countries. An-
other test of the direct implications of bank ownership in industrialized countries is
Sapienza (2004). She reports that Italian state-owned banks charged systematically
lower interest rates on loans but prefer at the same time to lend to larger ﬁrms be-
tween 1991 and 1995. Overall, she concludes that state-ownership fosters ineﬃcient
capital allocation and may thus depress ﬁnancial development, output, and produc-
tivity. Both studies, however, do not explicitly estimate the eﬀect of privatization
on productivity but accounting based measures of performance.
Second, most studies neglect the dynamic implications of the privatization pro-
cess. According to Berger et al. (2005) and Bonin et al. (2005) this is important
since both timing and the mode of privatization aﬀect bank’s performance. The
former study shows that state-owned banks in Argentina exhibit poor long run per-
formance but the most pronounced improvements after privatization. Related, Bonin
et al. (2005) report for a sample of banks in six Eastern European countries that
early cohorts of privatized banks are more eﬃcient compared to banks privatized at
later stages. Therefore, we account explicitly for the timing of privatization and the
dynamic eﬀects on TFP change. A closely related and important aspect that is often
neglected in the literature concerns the interdependency between privatization and
consolidation. There has been considerable research on the eﬀects of M&As. But
only few studies analyze the possible beneﬁts for banks’ TFP change. Most studies
focus instead on consolidation eﬀects on individual TFP components, for instance
eﬃciency.3 Furthermore, we are unaware of a study that compares mergers in a lib-
eralized market to mergers in a market maintaining the status quo of state-owned
banks. Our joint analysis of both privatization and mergers in both Germany and
Italy allows us to compare merger eﬀects following privatization to a control group
of mergers without privatization. We can investigate if mergers yield a stronger ef-
fect in an environment with potentially more partners following deregulation and
which components of TFP change beneﬁt in particular, for instance cost or scale
eﬃciencies.
Third, ambiguous results may partly reﬂect methodological diﬀerences. Many
studies use Malmquist index to decompose productivity into diﬀerent components.4
However, non-parametric methods as the Malmquist index neglect the eﬀects of
random noise and are sensitive to outliers, which is why other studies use para-
metric models to estimate TFP growth or technological progress.5 One parametric
3See Berger et al. (1999) for a comprehensive survey, Focarelli et al. (2002) and Resti (1998)
for Italian and Lang and Welzel (1999) and Koetter (2008) for German banking system evidence.
4See, for example, Berg et al. (1992) (Norway), Alam (1998) (Turkey), Gilbert and Wilson
(1998) (Korea), Wheelock and Wilson (1999) (U. S.) and Isik and Hassan (2003) (Turkey).
5See Casu et al. (2004) for a comparative analysis of parametrical and non-parametrical pro-
7studies that investigates multiple components of TFP is Stiroh (2000). He reports
positive overall productivity growth for a sample of U.S. bank holding companies in
the 1990s, primarily due to positive changes in scale economies. But he also reports
increased cost ineﬃciency as a result of deregulation. In contrast, Kumbhakar and
Lozano-Vivas (2005) ﬁnd that deregulation in the Spanish banking industry con-
tributes univocally positive to TFP growth through both reductions of ineﬃciency
and technical progress. In our analysis of privatization and consolidation, we there-
fore distinguish the respective eﬀects on all three components of TFP change: scale
eﬀects, technical change, and eﬃciency developments.
3 The Italian and German Banking Systems
At the end of the 1980s the Italian banking system consisted of private banks, public
banks (both savings institutions and stated-owned banks), 6 and credit cooperatives.
The system was highly fragmented, with a large number of relatively small insti-
tutions and a signiﬁcant presence of state-owned banks (see table 1). At that time
there were no universal banks and the institutions were classiﬁed according to the
business specialization as commercial banks or as special credit institutions.7 In
addition, the regional network and business activities were strictly regulated.
In the course of the 1990s, this structure was radically altered. During the 1990s
public banks were transformed into joint-stock companies and split into two separate
entities, a "foundation" and a "stock corporation".8 The foundation represented the
original legal entity, conferred its banking division to the stock corporation and held
the stock. The "stock corporation" (the bank) conducted banking business. In 1994
and 1999 tax incentives were introduced for foundations to disinvest themselves of
their bank shares.9 Together with the reform of the ownership structure of public
banks, a set of other important reforms took place in the 1990s, in part as a conse-
quence of the implementation of the Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC). The
mandatory specialization was gradually removed after 1990, so that, thanks to the
new universal bank model, credit institutions could raise funds in any form and un-
dertake any business activities (such as factoring, leasing, medium- and long-term
lending, and merchant banking). Restrictions on geographical diversiﬁcation were
lifted and the concept of "a banking group" was introduced in the legislation.
As a consequence of this wave of reforms, the nature of the banking system
changed substantially. The share of total assets controlled by public banks decreased
considerably, from 59.6 to less than 10 percent, and the number of banks dropped
ductivity measurements.
6The state presence in the banking system dates back to the creation of IRI ("Istituto per la
Ricostruzione Industriale") after the Great Depression. It was a publicly-owned holding company
controlling the three largest public banks: Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito Italiano, and Banca
di Roma.
7Commercial banks were specialized in short-term business, i.e. shorter than 18 months, while
special credit institutions were specialized in medium- and long-term business and often in one
particular sector, such as agriculture, building, public enterprizes or industry (Carletti et al., 2005).
8Law No. 218 of 1990 (Amato-Carli Law): The restructuring and integration of the equity of
public sector banks.
9Law No. 474 of 1994 (Dini Directive) and Law No. 461 of 1998 (Ciampi Law).
8by 26.5 per cent to 784 (see table 1). These trends were accompanied by a process
of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) among banks which, in terms of the number
of institutions involved, reached its peak in the course of the 1990s. Between 1990
and 2004 a total of 620 M&As were recorded, involving more than half of the total
assets of the Italian banking system. At the same time, thanks to the liberalization
of branching, the number of bank oﬃces increased by around 78 per cent and the
availability of banking services improved. Furthermore, the average size of banks
increased.10
The German banking system is a universal banking system. Like the Italian
banking industry at the beginning of the 1990s, the banking industry in Germany is
composed of public and private credit institutions, and of credit cooperatives ("three-
pillar system"). However, in contrast to Italy, the German banking system did not
undergo fundamental liberalization during the 1990s (Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004).
Furthermore, regional and central savings banks in each state are governed by state
law and cannot be taken over by an institution from another pillar (Brunner et al.,
2004). However, the number of institutions dropped considerably in the last decade:
from 4,589 in 1990 to 2,089 in 2004 (see table 1). At the same time, the average size
of banks increased by almost 60 percent. Although the number of publicly-owned
banks also declined steadily due to intra-pillar mergers rather than privatization,
the asset share of public banks did not change signiﬁcantly (35.1 percent in 1990
and 34.5 percent in 2004). 11
Table 1: Privatization and Consolidation of Italian and German Banks (1990-2004)
Country Banking Groups No. of Banks Asset Share
1990 2004 1990 2004
Italy Public banks 93 - 59.6 -
Private commercial banks 106 243 20.5 79.3
Cooperative and mutual banks 823 475 18.5 14.9
Branches of foreign banks 37 66 1.6 5.80
Total 1064 784 100 100.00
Germany Public banks 784 489 34.79 33.30
Private commercial banks 305 168 27.45 31.99
Cooperative and mutual banks 3416 1338 14.84 10.42
Specialized institutions 73 68 21.54 23.00
Branches of foreign banks 60 84 1.35 1.23
Total 4638 2147 100 100.00
Source: Bundesbank and Banca d’Italia, Monthly reports.
10Tables 9 and 11 in the Appendix give further insight into the structure and performance of
the Italian banking system during the period of analysis.
11Tables 10 and 12 in the Appendix give further insight into the structure and performance of
the German banking system during the period of analysis.
94 Productivity Change of Italian and German Banks
In this section we analyze productivity growth in the German and Italian banking
markets. We begin by presenting the method for determining productivity growth.
Next, we discuss the data that we use to calculate bank individual growth rates.
We then compare aggregate productivity changes in Italy and Germany over time.
Finally, we test for σ convergence in productivity between Italian and German banks.
4.1 Methodology
Many studies use, in an input-output framework, deterministic index methods such
as the Divisia Index, which measures productivity change as the diﬀerence between
output and corresponding input index changes (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). A
disadvantage of such index methods is that they do not provide information about
the sources of productivity changes.12 For this reason, we follow the econometric ap-
proach suggested by Bauer (1990) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). In particular,
we derive TFP change – and its components – by estimating a cost frontier that
also takes account of the multi-product nature of bank production.
While taking into account bank-speciﬁc eﬀects (see below), we estimate a com-
mon frontier for both banking markets together rather than one for each country.
However, our main objective is to compare the banking markets in Italy and Ger-
many, whereas the latter approach would only allow for a comparison of banks
within each country. When specifying a common frontier it is imperative to ade-
quately account for systematic diﬀerences in the production function as well as in
macroeconomic and regulatory conditions (Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002) and Dietsch
and Lozano-Vivas (2000)). But we also note that Italian and German banks op-
erated as universal banks in a common market for ﬁnancial services13 during the
entire period under investigation and therefore had, at least in principle, access to
the same production technology. We also take great care in harmonizing the national
diﬀerences in the variables speciﬁed for the production function. However, we did
not only include country speciﬁc-eﬀects in the production function but went one
step further and added (unobserved) bank-speciﬁc eﬀects to the frontier equation.14
In particular, we assume that every bank k is subject to a technology constraint
T(•), which is time-dependent. At any time t, and given an input price vector w,
each bank k chooses an input vector x in order to produce an output vector y. An
optimal cost frontier in logs is then:15
lnCkt = αk + f(ykt,wkt,zkt,t) + vkt + ukt (1)
12Furthermore, since they do not account for random noise, non-parametric methods are also
more sensitive to outliers (Coelli et al., 2005).
13The First Banking Directive (1977), the EU White Paper (1985) and the Second Banking
Coordination Directive (1988) led to the establishment of the Single Market for Financial Services
on January 1, 1993.
14An alternative to our approach is provided by Bos and Schmiedel (2007), who estimate single
frontiers for a sample of European countries and then apply a meta-frontier.
15We assume that the function has a translog form and estimate it with the software Limdep.
Estimated parameters for the cost function are provided in the Appendix on page 32.
10where f(ykt,wkt,zkt,t) is the kernel of the optimal cost frontier, αk is a vector
of bank-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, zkt is a vector of banks’ observable characteristics and
εkt = vkt + ukt is the composite error term. In any year t, a bank can deviate from
optimal costs due to random noise, vkt, or ineﬃcient management, ukt. The ran-
dom error term vkt is assumed to be i.i.d. with vkt ∼ N(0,σ2
v) and independent
of the explanatory variables. The ineﬃciency term is i.i.d. with ukt ∼ N|(0,σ2
u)|
and independent of vkt
16. Bank-speciﬁc point estimates of eﬃciency are obtained
as E(ukt|εkt), i.e. the mean of ukt given εkt (Jondrow et al., 1982). Parameter esti-
mates of the cost frontier in equation (1) are depicted in table 13 in the Appendix.
In table 13 the signiﬁcance of λ, the ratio of the variance due to ineﬃciency and
the variance due to random noise, shows the existence of ineﬃciency; a frontier is
therefore preferred to an ordinary cost function.
From equation (1) we derive three components for TFP change: technological
progress, the realization of scale economies and eﬃciency changes. The sum of the
three components, as depicted in equation (2), is a measure of total productivity
change:17












The ﬁrst expression on the right-hand side of equation (2) represents the com-
ponent of TFP change resulting from banks’ realization of scale economies (in the
following SC), the second term describes technological change (in the following TC),
and the last expression depicts the change in technical eﬃciency (in the following
EFC). The component that describes the realization of scale economies depends
on two eﬀects: scale elasticities as captured by the term inside the brackets and
the changes in output volume. Note that, if a bank exhibits constant or negative
returns to scale, ( ∂ lnCk(y,w,z,t)/∂ lny ≥ 1), a change in the level of output does
not contribute positively to TFP growth. The second component of equation (2)
depicts changes in technology. Under technological progress, a given volume of out-
puts can be produced – at the eﬃciency level – at lower costs. Many papers estimate
technical changes by estimating separate frontiers per year and then disentangling
cost changes due to changed parameters from those due to changing variables. In
our view, the estimation of separate functions at each year is problematic for the
same reasons that we mentioned above with regard to the estimation of separate
frontiers for diﬀerent countries. Instead, we follow Baltagi and Griﬃn (1988) and
add a time trend t along with interaction terms of time and input prices as well as
output quantities. This allows us to derive technical change as the sum of partial
time derivatives. 18 The ﬁnal component of equation (2) captures the contribution
to productivity change of changes in the cost of technical ineﬃciency. Until very
recently, econometric models of productivity by and large ignored the contribution
16We impose linear homogeneity restrictions by dividing prices and total cost by the price of one
input.
17We assume the input mix is allocative eﬃcient. Therefore, the additional component of TFP
growth that captures the impact of deviation of actual input cost shares from eﬃcient input cost
shares and the component caused by allocative ineﬃciency are not included in the decomposition
of TFP change we consider here. For more details see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
18For an application to European banking, see Altunbas et al. (1999).
11of eﬃciency. However, if ineﬃciency exists, its change provides an independent con-
tribution to productivity. To measure these changes, it is important to specify the
frontier in such a way that it allows for time-varying ineﬃciency. In contrast to
many other studies that have analyzed the evolution of eﬃciency, we do not impose
any functional form for the change in eﬃciency, which provides greater ﬂexibility in
modelling its dynamics.
4.2 Data
In our analysis, we consider all universal banks with the exception of the head
institutions of German credit cooperatives (DZ bank and WGZ bank) and savings
banks (the Landesbanks), which, given their specialist nature, do not appear to be
comparable with the other market participants (Altunbas et al., 1999). Balance sheet
data and P&L accounts were provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Banca
d’Italia. The time period under consideration covers the years from 1994 to 2004.
Earlier years have been excluded because they were either missing or not completely
available.19
Table 2: Bank Production Data for Italian and German Banks (1994-2004)
Country Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Italy Interbank Loans y1 212.432 1,117.340 0.004 22,396.290 6362
Customer Loans y2 974.752 4,437.375 0.601 94,681.380 6362
Securities y3 250.871 835.180 0.008 13,160.680 6362
Price of Fixed Assets w1 5.890 2.455 1.993 19.671 6362
Price of Labor w2 48.476 5.818 30.573 80.694 6362
Price of Funds w3 3.697 1.936 1.010 15.689 6362
Equity z1 136.722 561.552 0.558 11,677.200 6362
Non-performing Loan Share z2 8.907 6.752 0.008 38.181 6362
Total Cost C 110.015 486.868 0.569 9,280.111 6362
Germany Interbank Loans y1 127.124 1,869.644 0.001 103,324.500 27736
Customer Loans y2 478.666 3,818.360 1.129 204,335.800 27736
Securities y3 185.887 1,667.635 0.002 99,729.890 27736
Price of Fixed Assets w1 14.532 8.033 5.135 74.130 27736
Price of Labor w2 48.530 7.352 28.386 92.741 27736
Price of Funds w3 3.515 0.651 1.868 5.475 27736
Equity z1 35.798 290.488 0.245 14,052.140 27736
Non-performing Loan Share z2 5.788 4.483 0.000 31.614 27736
Total Cost C 46.129 396.123 0.356 21,705.730 27736
Notes: Outputs, equity and total cost are expressed in millions of euro.
Price of funds, price of ﬁxed assets and non-performing loans share are expressed in percent.
Price of labor is expressed in thousands of euro.
We follow the intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977) and deﬁne
three input and output categories. Input quantities are: ﬁxed assets x1, such as
branches and administrative buildings; labor x2, measured as full-time equivalents
(FTE); and borrowed funds x3, measured as the volume of deposits and bonds.
As outputs we deﬁne the volume of interbank loans y1, customer loans y2, and
investments in stocks and bonds y3. According to our deﬁnition, interbank activities
are considered as an output when they sit on the left hand side of the balance sheet
19Data are available for Italian banks back to 1986 but only back to 1993 for German institutions.
This is mainly because East German banks were not included in the statistics prior to 1993.
Furthermore, the German database presents for the year 1993 a large number of missing values.
12(interbank loans, y1) and as an input when they sit on the right hand side (borrowed
funds, x3). It has been noted in the literature on bank eﬃciency that it is important
to include a measure of risk in the regression equation (Mester, 1993). Therefore
we include equity z1 and non-performing loans z2 as control variables in the cost
function.
Table 2 displays the variables considered here and their respective mean, stan-
dard deviation, minimum and maximum. All currency variables are expressed in
euro and are adjusted for inﬂation.20 The Italian sample amounts to 6,362 obser-
vations and the German sample to 27,736. We have adjusted the initial database
for outliers in three steps. First, we dropped all observations belonging to the ﬁrst
and 99th percentile. Then, as the translog function cannot handle zeros or, equally,
missing values or negative values we conﬁned the sample to those banks that have
strictly positive inputs and outputs. Finally, having calculated the components of
TFP change, we dropped all observations with implausible rates of output changes.21
Here, we use the method suggested by Hadi (1992) and Hadi (1994) for the identi-
ﬁcation of multiple outliers in multivariate databases.
4.3 Results of the Productivity Analysis
The results of the productivity analysis are shown in table 3. We report TFP change
measures (TFPC) and its components technical change (TC), eﬃciency change
(EFC) and change in scale economies (SC). The change in scale economies, in
turn, is the product of scale elasticities (SE) and the change in output volume (
·
Y ).
We also show TFP changes according to the traditional Divisia Index method
(Hulten, 2000). We calculate the Divisia Index as the change in the ratio of total
costs (C) to total output (Y ). It is a well-known fact that the Divisia method
will usually deliver results that deviate from parametric methods; the gap between
the two can sometimes be signiﬁcant (Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005). One
reason for the deviation is that the Divisia method necessarily also includes price
changes that are usually not considered in parametric analysis. In our sample, the
Divisia method reports signiﬁcantly larger values than the parametric method. It
is reassuring, however, and supports the stability of our ﬁndings, that the ranking
of TFP changes – between countries and by and large also between banking groups
– is the same. Since only the parametric but not the Divisia approach allows for a
breakdown of TFP change into its components, we will henceforth only consider the
former.
According to the parametric estimates, productivity increased, on average, by 3.2
percent in Italy and 1.2 percent in Germany over the observation period. Likewise,
with the exception of eﬃciency change, all TFP components also exhibit higher rates
of change in Italy than in Germany. At the same time, the relative importance of the
individual components diﬀers between Italy and Germany. Technological progress,
for example, has had much greater importance in Italy than in Germany: Techno-
logical progress led ceteris paribus to a downward shift of the cost frontier and thus
to an improvement in productivity of 2.3 percent in Italy but of only 0.4 percent in
20Data are converted into 1995 prices using own country GDP deﬂators.
21Some banks have implausible rates of higher than 1000 points.
13Table 3: Average productivity growth of Italian and German banks (1994-2004)
Country/Bank Type Divisia2) TFPC = TC + EFC + SC (SE ×
·
Y ) N
Germany Total 0.027 0.012 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.139 0.055 21620
Saving banks 0.028 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.135 0.053 4843
Private banks 0.017 0.008 -0.007 0.001 0.015 0.184 0.072 575
Cooperatives 0.027 0.012 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.138 0.054 16202
Italy Total 0.074 0.032 0.023 -0.003 0.012 0.129 0.098 4604
Formerly State owned1) 0.069 0.022 0.020 -0.002 0.003 0.201 0.019 58
Formerly Saving banks1) 0.071 0.027 0.020 -0.007 0.014 0.177 0.073 548
Private banks 0.049 0.027 0.026 -0.011 0.012 0.141 0.085 349
Cooperatives 0.062 0.022 0.021 -0.012 0.013 0.149 0.091 554
Mutual banks 0.079 0.036 0.024 0.0001 0.012 0.114 0.107 3095
Notes: TFPC= Total Factor Productivity Change, TC= Technical Change, EFC= Eﬃciency Change,
SC= Change in Scale Economies, SE= Scale Elasticities,
·
Y = Output Change. 1) Privatized during the
sample period. 2) For comparability reasons we consider here the negative of the Divisia Index. We tested
the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in the values of TFPC and its components using a t-test for
unpaired samples. Diﬀerences between Italy and Germany are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while diﬀerences
between banking groups are only in part statistically signiﬁcant. For more details see table 15, table 16 and
table 17 in the appendix
Germany. These results are, in the case of Italian banks, in line with OECD (2000)
and Amel et al. (2004) which identify rapid technological advances as one main
reason for the increase in competition and productivity. Both banking markets ben-
eﬁted from the presence of positive returns to scale and increasing credit demand.
In Germany, about 67 percent of the productivity growth is explained by gains in
scale economies while in Italy it explains only 37 percent of the overall growth. Still,
the scope for scale economies was larger in Italy, where credit demand also increased
more strongly. With regard to eﬃciency changes, our results show that productiv-
ity growth arising from higher eﬃciency is negligible, or, in the case of Italy, even
slightly negative.
As diﬀerences in productivity growth between Italian and German banks might
be driven by speciﬁc institutions, we report average results by banking groups. In-
deed, the results highlight great diﬀerences between German private banks, on the
one hand, and savings and cooperative banks, on the other. While the latter im-
proved their productivity by 1.2 percent, the former saw TFP growth of only 0.8
percent. The diﬀerence is even bigger for technical change alone. This is a surprising
result since the sector of private banks includes the big and internationally active
banks which are said to operate in a highly competitive environment. However,
the sector of private banks in Germany is very heterogeneous as it contains, apart
from the big banks, many small and specialized credit institutions. Furthermore, the
diﬀerence might also just reﬂect the fact that German private banks were already
operating at a higher productivity level and that the other two bank groups were
converging to this higher level. We will discuss convergence issues in more detail
below.
Due to the liberalization in Italy, formerly state-owned banks and formerly pri-
vate banks all operate as private and universal banks without regional restrictions.
Indeed, the results show that productivity gains in Italy do not diﬀer substantially
across banking groups. With the only exception of mutual banks, which had the
14highest improvement in productivity, the banking groups exhibit fairly homoge-
neous productivity growth. Formerly saving banks (now private commercial) as well
as commercial banks grow on average by 2.7 percent, and formerly state owned (now
private commercial) and cooperative banks by 2.2 percent. Furthermore, the larger
TFP growth of mutual banks indicates that small banks experienced above-average
productivity growth during the 1990s, possibly as a result of higher competitive
pressure (Amel et al., 2004). Private banks proﬁted most from technical change,
which represents the most important factor for TFP growth in Italy. Interestingly,
eﬃciency change was negative for all banking groups in Italy, with the exception of
mutual banks. Potentially small banks, as mutual banks, react to stiﬀer competition
by becoming more cost-eﬃcient.































In general, the trend in TFP change and its components over time is more ho-
mogenous in Germany than in Italy (ﬁgure 1). TFP change in Germany varies
between -0.006 and 0.02 while, in Italy, it ranges between -0.009 and 0.75. More-
over, the pattern of TFP change in Italy seems to follow the development of the
privatization process: After the Dini Directive of 1994 and the Ciampi legislation of
1999, productivity improved substantially, as can be seen by the positive peaks in
1996 and 2001.
As we already noted above, eﬃciency changes (EFC) of Italian and German
banks are, on average, of minor importance for TFP growth (table 3). Nevertheless
the evolution of eﬃciency change over time reveals two spikes in 1996 and 1999 that
had an impact on overall TFP change (ﬁgure 1). To better understand these trends,
in ﬁgure 2 we report cost eﬃciency in terms of levels.
In the run-up to 1999 (Ciampi legislation and introduction of the euro) banks
managed to improve their eﬃciency. One potential reason might be that ﬁercer
competition forced banks to operate more eﬃciently. The deterioration in eﬃciency
in both the Italian and the German market around 1999 might reﬂects bankers’ lack
of cost-consciousness when ﬁnancial markets were soaring and the contemporaneous
costs of labor and borrowed funds decreased. Only after the stock market crashed did
the necessity to keep costs in check regain prominence, and cost eﬃciency improved
since 1999/2000, albeit in small measure. Another reason for the trough in 1999
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might be high reorganization costs due to an increase in M&As. In fact, in Italy
the percentage of total assets involved in M&As averaged 3.2 percent in the periods
1995-1997 and 2000-2004 and peaked at 14.02 percent between 1998-1999. The same
holds for Germany, as the majority of M&A took place between 1997 and 2000.
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The development of scale economies SC over time supports the evidence found
by Cavallo and Rossi (2001) that the optimal bank size increased in the wake of
ongoing deregulation. As can be seen in ﬁgure 3, the evolution of scale economies of
Italian banks had a distinct pattern, but was the reverse of the evolution of eﬃciency,
as it peaked in 1999.
Regarding the evolution of technical progress , TC (dashed line), ﬁgure 1 high-
lights three important characteristics. First, German banks have had a relatively
constant rate of change in technology while in Italy technical change ﬂuctuated to
a larger extent during the period under investigation. Technical change in Italy in-
creased until 1999 and decreased over the remainder of the sample period. Thus, we
observe a downward shift in the cost function, ceteris paribus, from 1995 to 1999 for
16Italian banks. This shift might be attributed to both the decrease in labor cost until
1998 and the decrease in the interest rate on borrowed funds until 1999. Second,
while technical change is the most important contributor to productivity gains in
Italy, the scope for further improvement seems to be diminishing.
Table 4: Convergence in Productivity Change of Italian and German Banks (1994-
2004)
Sample Productivity Measures Mean SD Min Max
1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004
Pooled
TFPC 0.020 0.019 0.051 0.052 -0.387 -0.267 0.311 0.742
TC 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.009 -0.038 -0.033 0.088 0.086
EFC 0.002 0.004 0.048 0.046 -0.353 -0.269 0.291 0.651
SC 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.013 -0.037 -0.038 0.128 0.105
C/Y 0.075 0.051 0.015 0.008 0.039 0.030 0.235 0.152
Italy
TFPC 0.025 0.036 0.059 0.068 -0.153 -0.132 0.240 0.742
TC 0.033 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.006 -0.021 0.088 0.086
EFC -0.015 0.009 0.055 0.060 -0.175 -0.159 0.202 0.651
SC 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.015 -0.037 -0.028 0.079 0.105
C/Y 0.106 0.046 0.013 0.009 0.068 0.031 0.235 0.152
Germany
TFPC 0.019 0.014 0.049 0.045 -0.387 -0.267 0.311 0.281
TC 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.008 -0.038 -0.033 0.038 0.037
EFC 0.005 0.003 0.046 0.041 -0.353 -0.269 0.291 0.285
SC 0.011 0.005 0.012 0.011 -0.030 -0.038 0.128 0.097
C/Y 0.070 0.052 0.008 0.008 0.039 0.030 0.161 0.147
Notes: TFPC= Total Factor Productivity Change, TC= Technical Change, EFC= Eﬃciency
Change, SC= Change in Scale Economies, C/Y = Divisia Index Productivity Change.
Technical change, ﬁnancial deregulation and increased competition are often said
to have led to more ﬁnancial integration and convergence between European coun-
tries. Our trend analysis above does not support this hypothesis at least with regard
to average TFP growth in Italy and Germany. To study convergence in more de-
tail we also looked at σ convergence of TFP change and its components. 22 Table
4 reports the summary statistics, and in particular the standard deviation of TFP
change and its components. If the two banking systems had converged over time,
we would expect a decrease in the spread of productivity change. However, this is
not the case, as the standard deviation for bank-speciﬁc TFP growth is even higher
in 2004 than in 1994. On the other hand, it is still possible that, while divergence
in growth rates can be observed, banks’ productivity converges in levels.
To test this hypothesis, we look at the the ratio of total costs to total output
(C/Y ). We noted above that this is often a poor measure of productivity but we
use it here nevertheless in the absence of a better alternative.23 As we can see in
Table 4 the standard deviation of C/Y indeed diminishes over time, conﬁrming the
converge in productivity levels between Italian and German banks in general and
Italian institutions in particular.
In sum, our results show that banks’ productivity improved in both countries.
Italian banks productivity, however, improved substantially faster. The decomposi-
22See Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995), Sala-i Martin (1996).
23Recall that the Divisia Index is calculated as the change in the ratio of total costs to total
output. Reassuringly, the Divisia Index leads to similar results as our parametric measure of TFP
changes.
17tion of TFP growth highlights the fact that most of the gains in productivity are
attributable to technical change in Italy and the realization of economies of scale
in Germany. We also ﬁnd evidence for convergence in productivity between Italian
and German banks.
5 Impact of Privatization and Consolidation on Pro-
ductivity
The diﬀerences in productivity growth between German and Italian banks and be-
tween diﬀerent banking groups within the respective countries give rise to the ques-
tion of whether these diﬀerences can be explained by diﬀerent approaches to consoli-
dation and privatization and by diﬀerences in ownership. We therefore now turn the
analysis of how privatization and consolidation aﬀected individual banks. In doing
so, we aim to shed more light on the extent to which these strategies were successful
in boosting individual banks’ productivity growth. We wish to note from the outset,
however, that if these strategies were indeed successful, they are likely to have had
an even wider eﬀect that is not restricted to the aﬀected banks. In fact, by improv-
ing the productivity of a particular group of banks, other banks might equally strive
to enhance their productivity due to higher competitive pressure. Therefore, the
overall productivity gains of the banking sector in total that have been analyzed in
the previous sections may be also the result of “spill-over” eﬀects from one banking
group to other banks. These second-round eﬀects, though potentially important, are
not the subject of our subsequent analysis. Nevertheless, restricting our analysis to
actually privatized or merged banks will enable us to detect any “direct” eﬀect of
these strategies on the aﬀected banks.
As we have explained in the introduction there are theoretical reasons to expect
that private banks are more productive than public banks. But rather than analyzing
levels of productivity, which are diﬃcult to calculate for the aforementioned reasons,
we will look at productivity growth instead. Therefore the hypothesis that we will
analyze in the following can be stated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The privatization of banks will boost their productivity growth.
With respect to the consolidation of the banking sector, it has been noted in the
literature that the banking industry is likely to be subject to decreasing returns to
scale. Therefore, the main reason for a bank to engage in M&As probably lies in
beneﬁtting from scale economies. Our second hypothesis is therefore as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Mergers and acquisitions enhance banks’ productivity growth mainly
by helping them to reap the beneﬁts of scale economies.
As Wheelock and Wilson (2000) have shown, apart form productivity enhance-
ment, distress resolution is another important motive for mergers. Therefore, hy-
pothesis 2 refers only to voluntary mergers. These have to be distinguished from
distress mergers, i.e. those where one of the merging banks is on the brink of insol-
vency.
185.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
In order to test our hypotheses 1 to 2, we employ panel estimation techniques and
analyze the eﬀects of privatization on consolidation at single-entity level. The prin-
cipal structure of the underlying regression equation is as follows:24
gk,t = δ1· < Privatization >k,t +δ2· < M&As >k,t +δ3· < Public >k,t−1
+ δ4· < Controls >k,t +
X
j
δj D(j) + uk + εk,t (3)
Here git is either the TFP change or one of its components.
In the above speciﬁcation, public ownership or public control is indicated by
a dummy variable (Public). In line with the classiﬁcation of the Banca d’Italia,
we consider a bank to be public if the foundation owns more than 50% of the
bank’s shares. We also use a dummy variable to proxy the immediate privatization
eﬀects, which takes the value 1 if a public bank becomes private in the current
period (Privatized). In order to measure long-term eﬀects, we include a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is now private but was public three
years ago. This variable enters into the regression equation with lag 1 (in order to
avoid double counting of current eﬀects). Merger and acquisitions are proxied in
a similar fashion (M&As). In this context it is important to distinguish between
voluntary and distressed mergers. While it can be assumed that most banks engage
in voluntary mergers in order to enhance their productivity, distressed mergers are
arranged to avoid outright default. In fact, because of this, the incidence of the latter
is extremely rare.
In this analysis we use prudential information provided by the Bundesbank and
the Bank d’Italia, which collect information on banks considered under distress and
which have therefore merged with another bank. Therefore, if one of the merging
banks was under distress, we use a dummy variable called Distress. 25 In order to
measure longer-term eﬀects, we also include lagged variables.
It is important to note that contemporaneous privatization and consolidation
variables need to be considered as endogenous variables in the above regression
equation. Since the decision to privatize or to merge is likely to depend on the past
performance of the particular bank, we include a set of control variables in the
regression equation. More speciﬁcally, we calculate the change in the cost-to-income
ratio (CH_CI) and also include the logarithm of total assets as a measure for the
bank’s size (Size). All bank-speciﬁc variables are then either treated as endogenous
or pre-determined variables. We then apply GMM techniques and use all lags of the
respective bank-speciﬁc variables as instruments. In this regard we follow Blundell
24A full description of the variables can be found in table 14 in the Appendix.
25In case of Italian banks, the dummy DISTRESS takes the value of one when the last supevisory
rating (CAMEL) assigned to the bank involved in a merger as target belongs to the range classiﬁed
as "unfavourable" (in a ranking that contemplates the classes "favourable", "in-between", and
"unfavourable"). In case of German banks, the dummy DISTRESS takes the value of one when a
bank has losses amounting to 25% of liable capital or a negative operating result in excess of 25%
of liable capital.
19and Bond (1998) and use all available lags of the endogenous variables dated t − 2
and earlier as instruments in the diﬀerence equation, and ﬁrst diﬀerences dated t−1
and earlier in the level equation. We control for the macroeconomic developments
and other time eﬀects by including year dummies for each year in the observation
period.
5.2 Results of the Regression Analysis
We ﬁrst estimate equation (3) for TFPC as the dependent variable and then run
separate regressions for Germany and Italy (Model A in table 5). With regard to
Italy, the results show that public banks have experienced slower TFP growth than
their private peers. Consistent with this observation, the privatization of banks has
increased their productivity and the improvement is remarkably signiﬁcant not only
statistically but also in economic terms, although some of the improvement seems to
be reversed in the longer run. This result is in line with Kumbhakar et al. (2001) and
Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2005) who report increasing bank productivity after
deregulation. With regard to consolidation in the Italian banking sector, voluntary
mergers have an immediate and positive eﬀect on productivity.26
In Germany, we cannot measure any privatization eﬀects, simply because no
public bank was privatized in the observation period. It is remarkable, though, that
the ownership variable shows a positive sign, in contrast to the Italian case. In other
words, contrary to the experience in Italy, public banks showed a higher TFP growth
than other banks in Germany. The voluntary merger variable has the expected posi-
tive sign but is statistically insigniﬁcant. The short-term eﬀect of distressed mergers
is statistically insigniﬁcant as well, while a small negative eﬀect is visible in the
longer run.27
Part of the success of the privatization process in Italy might be due to the fact
that it also fostered consolidation in the banking sector. Indeed, when a public bank
turns private, it might subsequently be taken over by another private bank. In fact,
the privatization of public banks and their subsequent consolidation with banks
coming from other (private) pillars led to the creation of Italian banking groups.
In order to test this hypothesis, we include in Model B an interaction term of the
privatization and the merger variable. In order to avoid the problem of collinearity,
and because longer-term eﬀects turned out to be largely economically insigniﬁcant
anyway in Model A, we exclude these in Model B. In fact, the privatization variable
now becomes statistically insigniﬁcant, while the interaction term is not. This gives
support to the hypothesis that the privatization of banks in Italy has broadened
the basis for mergers in the banking sector and, thus, the potential for productivity
improvements.
We now turn to the analysis of the components of TFP change, i.e. technical
change, scale economies, and eﬃciency change. As regards technical change, the
ownership variable has again diﬀerent signs in Italy and Germany, indicating that
26Note that since we measure productivity gains, a one-time increase here has a permanent eﬀect
on productivity levels.
27A note on the Sargan test on over identifying restrictions: For Germany the low p-values point
to some misspeciﬁcation in the regression equation. In fact, as we will show below, there are partly
opposing eﬀects on the components of TFPC, i.e. on TC, EFC, and SC.
20public banks in Italy beneﬁted less from technical change than other Italian banks,
while in Germany they beneﬁted more. There is also a positive, albeit small eﬀect
of mergers on technical change in Italy. While in Germany the respective signs are
negative, they are also statistically insigniﬁcant.
Turning to our hypothesis 2, the results show that in both countries banks bene-
ﬁted from increasing returns to scale when they engaged in voluntary mergers, which
is in line with previous ﬁndings (Cavallo and Rossi, 2001). In both countries, public
banks beneﬁted less from scale economies than private or cooperative banks. To
exclude any size eﬀects here, we included size as a control variable (as we did in the
other regression equation). Again, the privatization of banks has a positive impact,
which indicates that privatization has helped banks to grow. It is worth noting, that
it is not the group of privatized banks that has been subsequently merged with an-
other bank (Privatized×M&As) that is driving this eﬀect, but instead the "pure"
privatization eﬀect alone.
It has been argued in the literature that the liberalization of markets helps banks
to reorganize their businesses and cut their costs. In fact, eﬃciency enhancements
seem to play an important role in the productivity gains of privatized banks. It
is worth noting that this eﬀect mainly comes from those banks that merged with
another bank after it had been privatized. Taken this into consideration, the "pure"
privatization eﬀect is even negative, pointing to restructuring costs in the immediate
period after the merger. Also, mergers as such have only a small eﬀect (in the case
of Italy), or none whatsoever, on eﬃciency change.
In sum, our results show that, in Italy, the privatization and consolidation pro-
cesses have positively inﬂuenced productivity growth, as did the consolidation pro-
cess in the German banking market.
21Table 5: The Eﬀect of Privatization and Mergers on TFP Change
Model A Model B





M&As 0.026*** 0.016 0.016** 0.032***
[5.02] [1.17] [2.51] [2.68]
Distress -0.054*** 0.030** -0.070*** 0.044***







L.Public -0.064*** 0.019** -0.021*** 0.018**
[7.20] [2.53] [2.84] [2.47]
L.Size -0.002 0.009*** -0.007*** 0.006***
[1.49] [5.02] [8.13] [3.55]
L.CH_CI -0.056*** 0.076*** -0.079*** 0.065***
[3.05] [5.48] [4.42] [5.01]
Test for AR(1) in ﬁrst diﬀerences (p-value):
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test for AR(2) in ﬁrst diﬀerences (p-value):
0.21 0.02 0.82 0.03
Sargan test of overid. restrictions (p-value):
0.80 0.00 0.97 0.00
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; ***
signiﬁcant at 1%. The year dummies coeﬃcient estimates are excluded for the sake of brevity.
Privatized and Privatized_LR are dummies variables indicating bank privatization in the current
year and within the last four years excluding the current; M&As and M&As_LR are dummies
variables indicating bank M&As in the current year and within the last four years excluding the
current; Distress and Distress_LR are dummies variables indicating bank distress mergers in the
current year and within the last four years excluding the current; Privatized×M&As is a dummy
variable indicating contemporarily bank privatization and merger in the current year; Public is a
dummy variable indicating public ownership; Size corresponds to bank total asset and CH_CI to
cost to income ratio.
22Table 6: The Eﬀect of Privatization and Mergers on Technical Change
Model A Model B





M&As 0.004*** -0.003 0.004*** -0.005
[2.83] [1.09]** [6.41] [1.63]
Distress -0.010** 0.005 0.011*** 0.003







L.Public -0.003 0.007*** -0.003** 0.007***
[1.50] [5.09] [2.42] [5.51]
L.Size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.003***
[5.71] [8.72] [4.91] [9.75]
L.CH_CI 0.017*** -0.009 0.026*** -0.016
[5.02] [0.84] [11.70] [1.44]
Test for AR(1) in ﬁrst diﬀerences (p-value):
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test for AR(2) in ﬁrst diﬀerences (p-value):
0.02 0.14 0.07 0.10
Sargan test of overid. restrictions (p-value):
0.84 0.36 0.84 0.88
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; ***
signiﬁcant at 1%. The year dummies coeﬃcient estimates are excluded for the sake of brevity.
Privatized and Privatized_LR are dummies variables indicating bank privatization in the current
year and within the last four years excluding the current; M&As and M&As_LR are dummies
variables indicating bank M&As in the current year and within the last four years excluding the
current; Distress and Distress_LR are dummies variables indicating bank distress mergers in the
current year and within the last four years excluding the current; Privatized×M&As is a dummy
variable indicating contemporarily bank privatization and merger in the current year; Public is a
dummy variable indicating public ownership; Size corresponds to bank total asset and CH_CI to
cost to income ratio.
23Table 7: The Eﬀect of Privatization and Mergers on Scale Economies
Model A Model B





M&As 0.008*** 0.020*** 0.004*** 0.021***
[7.59] [6.23] [3.55] [6.49]
Distress 0.005 0.023*** 0.001 0.028***







L.Public -0.005*** 0.014* -0.004*** 0.014*
[3.64] [1.78] [2.76] [1.76]
L.Size 0.000* 0.001 -0.001*** 0.001
[1.93] [0.62] [6.04] [0.63]
L.CH_CI -0.022*** -0.003 -0.012*** -0.003
[7.22]*** [0.91] [3.88] [1.18]
Test for AR(1) in ﬁrst diﬀerences (p-value):
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test for AR(2) in ﬁrst diﬀerences (p-value):
0.76 0.30 0.35 0.22
Sargan test of overid. restrictions (p-value):
0.20 0.00 0.79 0.00
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; ***
signiﬁcant at 1%. The year dummies coeﬃcient estimates are excluded for the sake of brevity.
Privatized and Privatized_LR are dummies variables indicating bank privatization in the current
year and within the last four years excluding the current; M&As and M&As_LR are dummies
variables indicating bank M&As in the current year and within the last four years excluding the
current; Distress and Distress_LR are dummies variables indicating bank distress mergers in the
current year and within the last four years excluding the current; Privatized×M&As is a dummy
variable indicating contemporarily bank privatization and merger in the current year; Public is a
dummy variable indicating public ownership; Size corresponds to bank total asset and CH_CI to
cost to income ratio.
24Table 8: The Eﬀect of Privatization and Mergers on Eﬃciency Change
Model A Model B





M&As 0.010* -0.009 0.008* 0.000
[1.84] [0.47] [1.84] [0.02]
Distress -0.04*** 0.003 -0.075*** 0.003







L.Public -0.046*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.015***
[6.67] [1.04] [3.94] [3.10]
L.Size 0.000 0.005*** -0.003*** 0.005***
[0.05] [3.20] [4.29] [3.35]
L.CH_CI -0.038** 0.060 -0.053*** 0.022***
[2.27] [0.73] [3.73] [0.29]
Test for AR(1) in ﬁrst diﬀerences (p-value):
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test for AR(2) in ﬁrst diﬀerences (p-value):
0.14 0.04 0.88 0.06
Sargan test of overid. restrictions (p-value):
0.69 0.20 0.97 0.13
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; ***
signiﬁcant at 1%. The year dummies coeﬃcient estimates are excluded for the sake of brevity.
Privatized and Privatized_LR are dummies variables indicating bank privatization in the current
year and within the last four years excluding the current; M&As and M&As_LR are dummies
variables indicating bank M&As in the current year and within the last four years excluding the
current; Distress and Distress_LR are dummies variables indicating bank distress mergers in the
current year and within the last four years excluding the current; Privatized×M&As is a dummy
variable indicating contemporarily bank privatization and merger in the current year; Public is a
dummy variable indicating public ownership; Size corresponds to bank total asset and CH_CI to
cost to income ratio.
256 Conclusions
In this study, we compare productivity growth in the Italian and German banking
markets, two systems that shared similar characteristics at the beginning of the
1990s with regard to their large number of institutions and the existence of publicly-
owned savings banks. Over the last decade both countries have undergone a profound
process of consolidation; However, whereas Germany kept its "three-pillar" system
of private banks, cooperative banks and publicly-owned banks, the Italian banking
system witnessed a profound privatization of its public banks.
We used a unique database provided by the central banks of Italy and Germany
to determine total factor productivity change in both countries. In calculating a com-
mon production frontier – while allowing for diﬀerences in production sets through
bank-speciﬁc eﬀects – we established a uniform yardstick against which to measure
bank’s performance. In doing so, we avoided the fallacy of comparing performance
measures derived from diﬀerent production frontiers. On the aggregate level, our re-
sults show that the productivity of Italian banks grew by 3.2% per year during the
period 1994-2004 and that of German banks by 1.2%. As a result, with Italian banks
starting from lower levels, aggregate productivity levels of both countries converged.
It is noteworthy that productivity levels in Italy also converge on a bank-speciﬁc
basis. At the same time, productivity growth rates do not converge, indicating that
the evolution of productivity is not yet at its steady state.
In a second step, we took a closer look and analyzed how consolidation and
privatization aﬀected banks individually. We found that banks that had been pri-
vatized saw a strong immediate positive eﬀect on their productivity growth. More
precisely, this eﬀect seems to be driven by those banks that had also been involved
in a merger after they had been privatized. This gives rise to the hypothesis that
it is not privatization per se that fosters greater productivity but the wider range
of consolidation options that comes with it. Further support for this hypothesis is
provided by the fact that mergers do seem to improve productivity in general. This
said, the results also suggest that there is a direct positive privatization eﬀect on
cost eﬃciency, indicating that liberalization in Italy has helped banks to cut their
production costs.
When it comes to the generalization of the eﬀect of public ownership on banks
productivity growth, some caution is requested. In fact, an important result of our
analysis is that public control over banks had opposite eﬀects on TFP change in
Italy and Germany. The view that state-owned banks are less eﬃcient, because they
maximize social objectives rather than proﬁt and managers experience low eﬀort on
keeping cost in check, seems to be supported by the Italian data but not by the
German ones. This shows that it is diﬃcult to judge public ownership on a general
level without taking into account country-speciﬁc circumstances. There is evidence
that low productivity of Italian public banks in the early 1990s may have been
caused by social interference which liberalization might have helped to eradicate.
In contrast, German savings banks are likely to enjoy greater independence, which
might explains their relatively good performance in the past.
In the period in which we were ﬁnalizing this paper, a deep and profound ﬁnancial
crisis has hit the international banking system worldwide. As a result, in order to
preserve the functioning of the banking system and the crucial role that banks play
26in the economy the Governments of many countries have taken signiﬁcant steps
to recapitalize banks through interventions funded with taxpayers’ money. Even if
Governments have clearly stated that public interventions in the banking systems are
to be considered on a strictly temporary basis, at the moment nobody can actually
foresee what the international ﬁnancial system will look like ﬁve, ten or ﬁfteen years
from now. Once the ﬁnancial system has recovered from the deep crisis started in
the summer of 2007 (soon, hopefully), we hope that the results of our analysis can
contribute to the (new) debate on the consequences of public- vs private-ownership
of banking systems.
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Commercial Banks 243 24,045 1,879,945 79.3
Banks of National Interest 3 1,459 86,466 12.9
Savings Banks 84 4,695 162,427 24.2
Private Commercial Banks 106 3,981 137,362 20.5
Cooperative Banks 108 3,290 95,004 14.2 36 3,745 228,532 9.6
Mutual Banks 715 1,792 29,096 4.3 Mutual Banks 2 439 3,603 126,369 5.3
Group central institutions 5 5 15,875 2.4 — —
Branches of Foreign Banks 37 50 10.475 1.6 66 108 137,063 5.8
Total 1,064 17,721 671,409 100 784 31,501 2,371,909 100
Source: Banca d’Italia
2. "banche di credito cooperativo"
Public-sector banks ("Istituti di diritto pubblico"), Banks of national interest ("Banche di interesse nazionale"), Savings banks ("Casse di risparmio" and "Monti di credito"),
Private commercial banks ("Banche di credito ordinario"), Cooperative banks ("Banche popolari"), Mutual banks ("Casse rurali e artigiane"), Group central institutions ("Istituti
centrali di categoria").






















Commercial Banks1 305 6,699 1,500.34 27.45 168 14,667 2,408.53 31.99
Savings Banks 772 19,288 1,069.94 19.57 477 14,292 1,002.02 13.31
Regional Giro Institutions 12 389 831.99 15.22 Land Banks 12 549 1,505.13 19.99
Credit Cooperatives 3,410 17,689 583.03 10.66 1,336 12,967 576.45 7.63
Regional Institutions of Credit Cooperatives 6 33 228.59 4.18 2 11 210.66 2.79
Specialized Banks2 73 225 1,177.25 21.54 68 2,922 1,731.59 23
Branches of Foreign Banks 60 34 74.04 1.35 84 83 93.34 1.23
Total 4,638 44,357 5,465.18 100 2,147 45,491 7,527.69 100
Source: Bundesbank, Monthly report.
1. 1990 includes: big banks, regional. 2004 includes: big banks and regional. 2. Mortgage banks, building and loan associations, and special purpose banks.
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9Table 11: Banking Performance Indicators - Italy
Year Average Net-Interest Non-Interest Operating Proﬁt Non-Interest Income / Operating Costs/ Staﬀ costs/ ROE
Total Assets (1) (2) Income (3) Income (3) Costs (3) Before Tax (3) Total Income Total Income Operating Costs
1994 100.0 2.48 0.91 2.36 0.30 26.9 69.5 47.4 1.1
1995 107.3 2.77 0.88 2.44 0.43 24.1 66.9 44.9 2.0
1996 119.2 2.63 1.06 2.43 0.60 28.6 65.8 45.2 5.1
1997 130.9 2.41 1.12 2.35 0.42 31.7 66.7 44.6 1.9
1998 137.8 2.33 1.51 2.30 0.93 39.2 60.0 39.1 9.2
1999 157.4 2.12 1.58 2.23 0.91 42.7 60.3 39.0 11.0
2000 180.7 2.21 1.74 2.27 1.16 44.1 57.5 36.4 13.3
2001 193.8 2.18 1.47 2.16 0.79 40.3 59.0 37.4 9.1
2002 199.0 2.25 1.30 2.15 0.67 36.7 60.7 38.8 6.5
2003 206.7 2.19 1.41 2.12 0.70 39.1 59.0 38.2 6.7
2004 210.7 2.15 1.37 2.05 0.97 38.9 58.2 38.3 10.7
Source: Banca d’Italia
(1) Total banking system’s assets divided by the total number of banks.
(2)Index numbers 1994=100.
(3)Ratios to total assets.
Table 12: Banking Performance Indicators - Germany
Year Average Net-Interest Non-Interest Operating Proﬁt Non-Interest Income / Operating Costs/ Staﬀ Costs/ ROE
Total Assets (1) (2) Income (3) Income (3) Costs (3) Before Tax (3) Total Income Total Income Operating Costs
1994 100.0 1.91 0.43 1.43 0.50 18.5 60.9 57.7 6.8
1995 105.9 1.72 0.43 1.38 0.50 19.8 64.1 57.9 6.6
1996 112.6 1.63 0.41 1.30 0.46 20.0 64.0 56.5 6.0
1997 121.7 1.46 0.42 1.19 0.45 22.2 63.3 55.9 6.7
1998 124.6 1.34 0.46 1.15 0.62 25.6 63.7 55.5 9.4
1999 130.9 1.23 0.49 1.14 0.37 28.5 66.2 54.2 5.9
2000 142.3 1.13 0.58 1.17 0.34 34.0 67.9 53.4 6.1
2001 171.6 1.10 0.51 1.15 0.24 31.6 71.0 52.3 4.4
2002 161.7 1.20 0.48 1.14 0.20 28.4 67.7 52.4 2.2
2003 155.8 1.15 0.54 1.13 0.10 31.7 66.9 53.0 -1.7
2004 158.0 1.15 0.47 1.07 0.20 29.0 66.0 53.5 1.8
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank
(1) Total banking system’s assets divided by the total number of banks.
(2)Index numbers 1994=100.
(3)Ratios to total assets.
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0Table 13: Stochastic Frontier Model - Estimated Parameters
Variable Coeﬃcient P[|Z|>z] Variable Coeﬃcient P[|Z|>z] Variable Coeﬃcient P[|Z|>z]
lnω1 0.3241 0.000 lnω1lny1 0.0200 0.000 t -0.1045 0.000
lnω2 0.2668 0.000 lnω1lny2 -0.0311 0.000 t2 -0.0008 0.000
lny1 0.2835 0.000 lnω2lny1 -0.0420 0.000 lny1t 0.0019 0.000
lny2 0.5769 0.000 lnω2lny2 -0.0677 0.000 lny2t 0.0202 0.000
lny3 0.4261 0.000 lnω3lny1 0.0360 0.000 lny3t -0.0004 0.2728
lnz1 -0.3131 0.000 lnω3lny2 -0.0757 0.000 lnω1t 0.0149 0.000
lnz2 0.1060 0.000 lny1lnz1 0.0215 0.000 lnω2t 0.0132 0.000
lnω1lnω1 0.0112 0.0006 lny1lnz2 0.0070 0.000 lnz1t -0.0229 0.000
lnω1lnω2 -0.1132 0.000 lny2lnz1 0.0244 0.000 lnz1t 0.0036 0.000
lnω2lnω2 0.1468 0.000 lny1lnz2 -0.0193 0.000
lny1lny1 0.0368 0.000 lny13lnz1 0.0042 0.0009
lny1lny2 -0.0445 0.000 lny1lnz2 0.0171 0.000
lny1lny3 -0.0201 0.000 lnω1lnz1 -0.0285 0.000 σ 0.43549635 0.000
lny2lny2 0.0696 0.000 lnω1lnz2 0.0065 0.000 λ 3.80702776 0.000
lny2lny3 -0.0480 0.000 lnω2lnz1 0.1990 0.000
lny3lny3 0.0595 0.000 lnω2lnz2 -0.0391 0.000
lnz1lnz1 -0.0522 0.000
lnz2lnz2 0.0077 0.000
y1: Interbank loans; y2: Customer loans; y3: Securities;
w1: Price of ﬁxed asset; w2: Price of labor; z1: Equity; z2: Non-performing loans.
Observations 34076; Log likelihood function: 14374.79; Iterations completed: 6.
Table 14: Regression Variables
Variable Acronym Deﬁnition
Privatization Privatized Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank was a publicly owned
bank in year t and is private in t+1.
Privatized_LR Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank was privatized within
the last four years, excluding the current year.
Public Ownership Public Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank was publicly owned in
year t-1.
Consolidation Merger Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank was involved in a merger
in year t.
Merger_LR Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank was involved in a merger
in year t-3.
Distress Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank was involved in a
distressed merger in year t.
Distress_LR Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank was involved in a
distressed merger in year t-3.
Privat. - Consol. Privatized×Merger Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank was privatized and
contemporaneously involved in a merger in year t.
31Table 15: Productivity Change and its Components - Signiﬁcance Test Italy versus Germany -
Country Italy Germany Diﬀerence Obs.
Divisia 0.074 0.027 0.047*** 26224
TFPC 0.032 0.012 0.020*** 26224
TEC 0.023 0.004 0.019*** 26224
EFC -0.003 0.001 -0.004*** 26224
SC 0.012 0.008 0.004*** 26224
SE 0.129 0.139 -0.010*** 26224
·
Y 0.098 0.055 0.044*** 26224
Notes:
TFPC= Total Factor Productivity Change, TC= Technical Change, EFC=
Eﬃciency Change, SC= Change in Scale Economies, SE= Scale Elasticities,
·
Y = Output Change. We tested the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in
the values of TFPC and its components using a t-test for unpaired samples.
*** indicates diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
3
2Table 16: Productivity Change and its Components - Signiﬁcance Test Germany
Bank Type Private Savings Diﬀerence Obs. Private Cooperatives Diﬀerence Obs. Savings Cooperatives Diﬀerence Obs.
Divisia 0.018 0.029 -0.011 5418 0.018 0.027 -0.009 16777 0.029 0.027 0.001 21045
TFPC 0.008 0.013 -0.005 5418 0.008 0.012 -0.004 16777 0.013 0.012 0.001 21045
TEC -0.007 0.004 -0.011*** 5418 -0.007 0.004 -0.011*** 16777 0.004 0.004 0.000*** 21045
EFC 0.001 0.002 -0.001 5418 0.001 0.001 0.000 16777 0.002 0.001 0.001 21045
SC 0.015 0.007 0.007*** 5418 0.015 0.008 0.007*** 16777 0.007 0.008 0.000*** 21045
SE 0.184 0.135 0.050*** 5418 0.184 0.138 0.046*** 16777 0.135 0.138 -0.004*** 21045
·
Y 0.072 0.053 0.019*** 5418 0.072 0.054 0.018 *** 16777 0.053 0.054 -0.001 21045
Notes:
TFPC= Total Factor Productivity Change, TC= Technical Change, EFC= Eﬃciency Change, SC= Change in Scale Economies, SE= Scale Elasticities,
·
Y = Output
Change. We tested the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in the values of TFPC and its components using a t-test for unpaired samples. *** indicates diﬀerences
are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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3Table 17: Productivity Change and its Components - Signiﬁcance Test Italy
Bank Type Public Cooperatives Diﬀerence Obs. Public Savings Diﬀerence Obs. Public Mutuals Diﬀerence Obs.
Divisia 0.069 0.063 0.006 612 0.069 0.071 -0.002 606 0.069 0.080 -0.010 3153
TFPC 0.022 0.022 -0.001 612 0.022 0.027 -0.005 606 0.022 0.036 -0.014*** 3153
TEC 0.020 0.021 0.000 612 0.020 0.020 0.001 606 0.020 0.024 -0.003 3153
EFC -0.002 -0.012 0.009 612 -0.002 -0.007 0.005 606 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 3153
SC 0.003 0.013 -0.010*** 612 0.003 0.014 -0.010*** 606 0.003 0.012 -0.009*** 3153
SE 0.201 0.149 0.051*** 612 0.201 0.177 0.023*** 606 0.201 0.114 0.087*** 3153
·
Y 0.019 0.091 -0.071*** 612 0.019 0.073 -0.054*** 606 0.019 0.107 -0.088*** 3153
Bank Type Private Cooperatives Diﬀerence Obs. Private Savings Diﬀerence Obs. Private Mutuals Diﬀerence Obs.
Divisia 0.050 0.063 -0.013 903 0.050 0.071 -0.021*** 897 0.050 0.080 -0.030*** 3444
TFPC 0.027 0.022 0.004 903 0.027 0.027 0.000 897 0.027 0.036 -0.009 3444
TEC 0.026 0.021 0.005*** 903 0.026 0.020 0.006*** 897 0.026 0.024 0.002 3444
EFC -0.011 -0.012 0.001 903 -0.011 -0.007 -0.004 897 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 3444
SC 0.012 0.013 -0.001 903 0.012 0.014 -0.002 897 0.012 0.012 0.000 3444
SE 0.141 0.149 -0.008 903 0.141 0.177 -0.036*** 897 0.141 0.114 0.027*** 3444
·
Y 0.085 0.091 -0.006 903 0.085 0.073 0.012 897 0.085 0.107 -0.023*** 3444
Bank Type Cooperatives Savings Diﬀerence Obs. Cooperatives Mutuals Diﬀerence Obs. Savings Mutuals Diﬀerence Obs.
Divisia 0.063 0.071 -0.008 1102 0.063 0.080 -0.017*** 3649 0.071 0.080 -0.008 3643
TFPC 0.022 0.027 -0.004 1102 0.022 0.036 -0.014*** 3649 0.027 0.036 -0.009*** 3643
TEC 0.021 0.020 0.001 1102 0.021 0.024 -0.003*** 3649 0.020 0.024 -0.004*** 3643
EFC -0.012 -0.007 -0.005 1102 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 *** 3649 -0.007 0.000 -0.007*** 3643
SC 0.013 0.014 -0.001 1102 0.013 0.012 0.001 3649 0.014 0.012 0.002 3643
SE 0.149 0.177 -0.028*** 1102 0.149 0.114 0.036*** 3649 0.177 0.114 0.064*** 3643
·
Y 0.091 0.073 0.018*** 1102 0.091 0.107 -0.017*** 3649 0.073 0.107 -0.034*** 3643
Bank Type Public Private Diﬀerence Obs.
Divisia 0.069 0.050 0.020 407
TFPC 0.022 0.027 -0.005 407
TEC 0.020 0.026 -0.005*** 407
EFC -0.002 -0.011 0.009*** 407
SC 0.003 0.012 -0.009 407
SE 0.201 0.141 0.059*** 407
·
Y 0.019 0.085 -0.065*** 407
Notes:
TFPC= Total Factor Productivity Change, TC= Technical Change, EFC= Eﬃciency Change, SC= Change in Scale Economies, SE= Scale Elasticities,
·
Y = Output
Change. We tested the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in the values of TFPC and its components using a t-test for unpaired samples. *** indicates diﬀerences
are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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